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Identifying structural shocks  






We examine the drivers behind loan supply fluctuations in Russia using Bayesian vector autore-
gressive model with sign restrictions on impulse response functions. We identify two types of struc-
tural innovations: loan supply shock and monetary stance shock. We find that contractionary shocks 
of both types contributed significantly and in the roughly equal measure to the decrease of bank 
lending after the Lehman Brothers collapse. 
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Identifying structural shocks  





Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan liikepankkien lainantarjonnan vaihteluita Venäjällä käyttäen Baysiläis-
tä vektoriautoregressiomallia, mikä identifioidaan käyttäen merkkirajoitteita impulssivastefunktiois-
sa. Määrittelemme kahdentyyppisiä rakenteellisia innovaatioita: lainan tarjontashokin ja rahapoli-
tiikkashokin. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että molemmat shokit vaikuttivat merkittävästi ja jokseen-
kin yhtä paljon pankkien lainanannon supistumiseen Lehman Brothersin konkurssin jälkeen.  
 
JEL: C11, C32, E51 
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1  Introduction 
 
Russia witnessed drastic loan supply fluctuations over the past decade. Rapid growth of credit ag-
gregates in 2006−2008 drove a credit boom that fuelled high economic growth. The global financial 
crisis of 2007−2009, while inducing a long period of financial stress in deleveraging developed 
countries, was weathered by Russia and many emerging economies with fairly modest impacts on 
real sector growth. Nevertheless, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 financial 
stress intensified on Russia’s financial markets and bank lending plummeted. At the culmination of 
the crisis in early 2009, the outlook for the real sector had seriously deteriorated. This situation be-
came a concern for the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), which made several attempts at reviving 
Russian credit markets. It also proved instructional to policymakers on the challenge of identifying 
drivers of loan supply dynamics. 
So to what extent should changes in credit be attributed to demand or supply shifts? How 
does one tell whether a credit drought is caused by supply factors related to changes in bank behav-
ior (e.g. changes in credit risk perception due to increased level of uncertainty) or deterioration of 
bank balance sheets? To resolve these questions, we estimate a Bayesian vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model comprising GDP, GDP deflator, loans to non-financial corporation (NFCs), interest 
rate on loans, and monetary stance variable (money stock) for the period prior to 2008Q4. Given its 
problematic nature, we discuss our choice of monetary policy stance variable in detail and compare 
the model results using alternative monetary policy stance variables. Sign restrictions are imposed 
on impulse response functions to identify structural innovations that might be considered loan sup-
ply or monetary stance shocks. Structural innovations are estimated with historical decomposition 
of lending trends into cumulated loan supply, monetary stance, and unidentified shocks. These are 
interpreted for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods. The obtained results suggest that lending 
trends were subject to negative loan supply shocks of unprecedented magnitude from the start of 
2009. Exceptionally cautious bank behavior remained in place until the end of the reviewed period 
(i.e. 2010Q1). The effect stemming from monetary policy stance shocks was mainly expansionary 
before the crisis and contractionary afterwards. We also observe large expansionary monetary inno-
vations in the end of the reviewed period. Our results appear to justify the use of a monetary stimu-
lus to boost the loan supply and show that lending trends in the period were to a large extent deter-
mined by the changes in the behavior of the banks in the altered macroeconomic environment. 
 Elena B. Deryugina and Alexey A. Ponomarenko  Identifying structural shocks 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the general description of the Rus-
sian banking sector, analyzing the relevant aspects CBR monetary policy in recent years. Section 3 
presents the formal model and discusses the choice of variables. Section 4 presents the empirical 
evidence and discusses policy implications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Recent trends in the Russian banking sector 
 
The expanded role of intermediation in Russian banking is rather new. Before the 1998 financial 
crisis, Russian banks were mostly involved in speculation in foreign exchange and government debt 
markets or acting as treasuries for their parent corporations. Channeling resources to the real sector 
was of minor significance. During the 2000s, Russian banking moved increasingly into traditional 
retail banking roles, particularly loan provision. Although the Russian banking sector remains small 
in terms of net assets to GDP when compared to other emerging economies (Fungáčová and So-
lanko, 2009a), credit flows to the real sector have increased rapidly in recent years and become an 
important determinant of cash flows in the economy. The rapid growth of deposits resulting in part 
from a heavily managed exchange rate regime and CBR forex purchases have provided banks with 
a rich resource for lending. Similar conditions have been seen in Asian economies with similar 
monetary policy regimes (Mohanty and Turner, 2010). Russia turned to the fiscal mechanism of the 
sovereign wealth fund to absorb foreign currency from central bank interventions. This approach 
proved insufficient to prevent rapid money stock growth in the face of an expansion in government 
spending and large capital inflows that triggered additional forex purchases. Moreover, the amount 
of foreign currency earnings diverted into sovereign wealth funds was linked by design solely to oil 
price fluctuations. 
 
Table 1  Nominal increases in banks deposits and credit in 2001-2007 (% of cumulative GDP) 
  Bank deposits  Domestic banks credit to private sector 
Industrial  countries  5.4  5.5 
Asia  14.8  11.3 
Latin America  5.1  4.6 
Baltics  7.1  16.4 
Russia  9.3  10.9 
Sources: Mohanty and Turner (2010); CBR 
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An important distinction between Russian and Asian banks was that the size of the lending booming 
exceeded deposit growth in 2006−2008, causing funding gaps to emerge. Russian banks relied on 
external borrowing to finance this gap; interbank lending in particular became dominated by trans-
actions with foreign counterparties (Fungáčová and Solanko, 2009b). As the world financial crisis 
unfolded, Russia found it increasingly difficult to tap foreign funding sources that had been major 
channels of financial stress transmission to Russian financial markets. This forced domestic banks 
to reduce lending (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010). 
Matters came to a head with the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008. Capital 
flows reversed and the erosion of the trade balance from falling oil prices put significant deprecia-
tion pressure on the ruble. Concerned about the possibility of the deterioration of balances in case of 
sharp depreciation, the CBR implemented a “controlled devaluation” in approximately 1% incre-
ments against its dual-currency basket. That strategy involved substantial forex sales that depleted 
the CBR’s gold and currency reserves by US$ 213 billion. The performance of the US dollar from 
August 2008 to April 2009 helped the private sector (and in particular, the banking sector) offset 

































































































































































































































































Liabilities to CBR Liabilities to domestic banks Liabilities to foreign banks
NFC deposits Households' deposits Other liabilitiesElena B. Deryugina and Alexey A. Ponomarenko  Identifying structural shocks 
behind loan supply fluctuations in Russia 
 
  8 
mented, this strategy reinforced expectations of further depreciation and induced additional demand 
(including speculative) for foreign currency. Combined with the general loss of confidence in the 
banking system, ruble deposits shrank by 15% during 2008Q4−2009Q1. The CBR was forced to 
raise interest rates to stem capital outflow.  
 




Tightening was only a temporary measure against depreciation pressures on the ruble. As soon as 
the forex market stabilized in February 2009, the CBR started to lower interest rates. The CBR and 
Russian government also introduced a package of measures aimed at providing additional liquidity 
(see CBR, 2009; Fidrmuc and Süß, 2009). These measures not only sought to preserve financial 
stability but also implement the monetary stance. Along with the recommencement of CBR forex 
purchases in the latter half of 2009, these steps led to rapid accumulation of excess liquidity in the 
banking sector. Money market rates dropped sharply and soon were again fluctuating near CBR’s 
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budget deficit directly from the sovereign wealth funds had a mechanical effect on the broad money 
stock. Deposits growth resumed in 2009 with virtually no support from the banking system. In fact, 
the preferences of banks for different types of assets evolved noticeably during the post-crisis pe-
riod. With the reversal of the ruble’s exchange rate dynamics in mid-2009, investor preference for 
foreign assets as risk-free (and extremely profitable during the depreciation period) investments was 
replaced with purchases of government securities (treasury notes and CBR bonds). Interestingly, 
demand of banks for corporate bonds also increased somewhat (Fungáčová and Kurronen, 2009). 
Increased bank lending was not observed until 2010Q2. 
 




The lending situation was constantly monitored by the Russian authorities from the latter half of 
2008. The sharp decline of lending of all categories was viewed as a substantial cause of the real 
sector’s contraction, and state support measures failed to produce immediate results. Yet it was un-
clear whether the observed drop of loans growth rates was actually inconsistent with other macro-
economic indicators − the Russian economy was, after all, in the midst of a severe recession. It is 
also unclear if monetary tightening was the main cause of these developments and, accordingly, the 
extent to which bank lending could be stimulated by providing more liquidity. In the next sections, 
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3  Model specification and data issues 
 
The empirical literature offers several approaches to modeling lending trends. Perhaps the most 
conventional is simply to estimate the loan demand function based on the relationship between 
loans and macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. GDP and interest rates). The results of such an exer-
cise in the Russian context (CBR, 2010) show lending trends to be generally in line with the fun-
damentals, i.e. actual loan growth does not deviate substantially from the estimated path. Such re-
sults, however, fail to distinguish whether the lending trend is purely demand driven or that the loan 
supply shocks simply coincide with (or cause) the recession. To tease out better insights, we need a 
method for disentangling loan supply and demand effects. One potential approach is to rely on mi-
croeconomic bank-level data in analyzing the impact of financial crisis on loan supply (e.g. Calani 
et al., 2010); Del Giovane et al., 2010). While promising, this approach is hard to apply given the 
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Identification of a loan supply shock on the basis of available aggregate data may be also attempted. 
De Mello and Pisu (2010) estimate six variables VECM for two cointegrating relationships, repre-
senting separate loan demand and loan supply equations for Brazil. This approach is replicated by 
Yudaeva et al. (2009) for Russia, who find that in 2009 actual loans were significantly higher than 
the equilibrium level implied by loans demand relationship, but lower than implied by loan supply 
relationship.  
An obvious caveat is that large VECM models are data intense, and here we must deal with 
a fairly short time series of Russian data. To overcome this, we assume that Bayesian estimation is 
more appropriate then canonical econometrics. We will also apply an agnostic identification scheme 
by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. Although somewhat subjective, 
this approach allows us to disentangle different types of shocks using the data in a very parsimoni-
ous way. 
Our empirical strategy is closely related to the method proposed by Busch et al. (2010), 
which can be briefly summarized as follows. Consider the conventional reduced-form VAR 
 
Yt = B(L)Y t-1 + ut ,                                                                                                                            (1) 
 
where Yt is an n x 1 vector of time series; B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; 
ut is an n x 1 vector of residuals with variance-covariance matrix E[ut u′t]=Σ. This model is estimated 
using a Normal-Wishart distribution prior for (B,Σ) as in Uhlig (2005). 
To decompose ut and obtain economically meaningful structural innovations, we need to 
find a matrix A such that Aet= ut, where et an n x 1 vector of structural innovations assumed to be 
independent so that E[et e′t]=In. The only restriction on A is 
 
Σ =E[ut u′t]= AE[et e′t]A′=AA′ .                                                                                                          (2) 
 
We need at least n x (n-1)/2 restrictions on A to achieve identification. We therefore re-
strict A to be a lower triangular as implied by Cholesky decomposition. For any orthogonal matrix 
Q with QQ′= In, Σ= AQQ′A′ is an admissible decomposition for Σ. As we cannot discriminate 
among different Q-matrices from the data, we select only those data that fulfill the a priori imposed 
restrictions on impulse responses. For that purpose, we first draw n times from the posterior distri-
butions of (B,Σ) and obtain n models. We then randomly select one from these and start combining 
it with randomly (as proposed in Rubio-Ramirez et al., 2005) generated Q-matrices, until the im-Elena B. Deryugina and Alexey A. Ponomarenko  Identifying structural shocks 
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pulse responses implied by this combination fulfill the restrictions. Following Busch et al. (2010), 
we discard the model and draw again if after p attempts sign restrictions are not fulfilled. We next 
iterate until we have m accepted sets consisting of VAR parameters, variance-covariance matrix of 
residuals and the appropriate identification scheme. Unlike Busch et al. (2010), we do not define the 
representative model as proposed in Fry and Pagan (2007). We find this approach yields results that 
are highly sensitive to the model’s setup (including the initial values for the random numbers gen-
erator used in the estimation algorithm). Instead, we report the median output (i.e. impulse response 
functions, identified structural innovations and the historical decomposition of loans developments) 
of the collection of all accepted models. The results obtained by this approach seem more robust. 
We include into our model the standard set of variables that generally capture loan supply 
and loan demand factors. These are GDP, price level (GDP deflator), interest rates (interest rate on 
ruble loans to NFCs with up to 1-year maturity) and loans (ruble loans to NFCs). Choice of a mone-
tary stance variable for Russia is less trivial. For outsiders, the obvious candidate would appear to 
be short-term money market interest rate (e.g. Busch et al., 2010). However, considering the relative 
insignificance of interbank money markets (particularly domestic) in Russia and the high volatility 
of short-term interest rates, it is doubtful that overnight money market interest rate or any CBR in-
terest rates per se would be adequate for this task. Juurikkala et al. (2009) come up against this chal-
lenge when modeling the bank lending channel in Russia. Their quite plausible solution is to use 
money stock as the monetary stance variable. Looking farther afield, the basic model by Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) assumes bank deposits as the loan supply determinant. Brissimis and Delis 
(2009) include deposits into the empirical model that utilizes bank-level data. In aggregate-level 
modeling, however, deposits are usually avoided due to the possibility of spurious correlation that 
does not adequately reflect structural relationships (Hülsewig et al., 2004). At the same time, when 
the deposits trend may be considered with certainty as exogenous, this indicator is appropriate for 
the purpose of loan supply modeling (for examples, see Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; 
and Imai and Takarabe, 2009). Given that the CBR’s forex purchases and fiscal policy measures 
have direct effect on money stock in Russia, we see the supposition of exogeneity as plausible. In-
deed, the choice of money stock as a monetary policy stance variable for modeling bank lending is 
quite common for the economies with managed exchange-rate regime even at aggregate level (e.g. 
Sun et al., 2010). We thus choose the stock of ruble bank deposits as the monetary stance variable 
for our model.  
We believe that using the indicator of deposits may be superior to other money measures 
(i.e. broad money or monetary base) as the composition of monetary aggregates was unstable during BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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the observation period. Specifically, the use of the deposits variable allows us to not only capture 
the gradual replacement of cash holdings by bank deposits that occurred in Russia at that time but 
also the episodes of massive withdrawing of deposits such as during the 2004 “crisis of confi-
dence.” We also cross-check our results from the benchmark model against those obtained using 
alternative monetary stance variables (monetary base and overnight interest rate).
 1 
We generally follow Busch et al. (2010) with regard to imposing sign restrictions on im-
pulse response functions (Table 2). By design, both expansionary loan supply and monetary stance 
shocks are reflected by a decrease in interest rates and increases in lending, GDP and price levels.
 2 
We identify monetary stance shocks as those preceded by deposit increases. Unlike Busch et al. 
(2010), who require a tightening of the monetary stance in response to an expansionary loan supply 
shock, we do not do that here as we lack adequate evidence to believe that CBR monetary policies 
were based on such an assumption during the reviewed period. Thus, we simply leave the monetary 
stance variable’s reaction unrestricted in the case of a loan supply shock. 
 
Table 2  Sign restrictions on impulse response functions 
Shock  Loan supply shock  Monetary stance shock 
Period  t = 0  t = 1  t = 2  t = 0  t = 1  t = 2 
GDP     +  +     +  + 
GDP deflator      +      + 
Interest rate  -  -        -  - 
Loans  +  +        +  + 
Deposits           +  +    
 
We estimate the model on our time sample for 1999Q1−2010Q4. While including crisis observa-
tions into the sample may cloud the results, estimating the model with the relatively short pre-crisis 
data series would limit us to analyzing only the favorable side of the economic cycle. Adding ob-
servations from the recession period seem reasonable in our pursuit of adequate results. Moreover, 
the imposed theoretically founded sign restrictions are validated on the full time sample; they are 
not supported by the pre-crisis time sample (see Annex II). 
Except for interest rate, all variables are in logs and seasonally adjusted with X-12. Quar-
terly data are used. We set the lag length to 3 as adding further lags would cause the instability of 
                                                 
1 The results obtained using the model with monetary base are reported in Annex III. The model with the short-term 
interest rate did not produce adequate results, affirming our choice of the money stock variables instead of interest rates. 
2 We use the term “monetary stance shock” rather than “monetary policy shock.” Given how CBR monetary policy was 
implemented in the period, our monetary stance variable takes in factors beyond the CBR’s defined decision-making 
scope (such as capital flows and fiscal policy setting). Elena B. Deryugina and Alexey A. Ponomarenko  Identifying structural shocks 
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the model and growing oscillation in the impulse responses. We set the number of initially drawn 
sets of VAR parameters to n = 1000, the number of attempts made to find the appropriate Q-matrix 
before the model is discarded to p = 1000 and the number of accepted models to m = 5000. Re-
markably, the results show convergence at this level; increasing these parameters further does not 
change the outcome significantly. 
 
 
4  Results 
 
We commence by estimating the median impulse responses, along with the 16% and 84% quantiles, 
to loan supply and monetary stance shocks that conform to the imposed sign restrictions. The result-
ing impulse responses (Figs. 5 and 6) for each type look quite similar. Both loan supply and mone-
tary stance shocks cause the positive impact on GDP, GDP deflator and loans, as well as a persist-
ing negative impact on the interest rate (particularly in case of monetary stance shock) that lasts no-
ticeably longer than the sign restrictions require. The impact of the shocks upon the loans peaks af-
ter about 6 quarters, signifying prolonged transmission. IN contrast, the impact on other variables 
starts to die out after the 2 or 3 quarters. The reaction of these variables is largely determined by the 
sign restrictions, so it is hardly surprising that both loan supply and monetary stance shock are simi-
lar in terms of GDP, prices, loans and interest rates responses. The impact of loan supply shock on 
deposits is unrestricted, however, and could thus be the main distinction between the two shocks. 
Notably, we find that both types of shocks are associated with the increase of deposits (although 
more pronounced in case of monetary stance shock). While this is by definition in the case of mone-
tary stance shock, this could be due to the direct effect of lending growth on money stock growth in 
case of the loan supply shock.  
This result may make it harder to distinguish between the two types of shocks. Interest-
ingly, there is no such effect when the monetary base is used as a monetary stance variable (see An-
nex III). This seems theoretically plausible; an expansion of lending only directly influences the 
money stock, not the monetary base. 
   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Figure 5  Impulse responses to the expansionary loan supply shock  
  (shaded area = sign restrictions periods) 
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Figure 6  Impulse responses to the expansionary monetary stance shock  
  (shaded area = sign restrictions periods) 














































Next, we calculate the median structural innovations identified as loan supply and monetary stance 
shocks. While the identified loan supply innovations (Fig. 6) fluctuate around zero for most of the 
pre-crisis period, we can readily pick out the large positive shock in 2004Q4 that marks the turning 
point after the 2004 credibility crisis of 2004 and the period of positive shocks that prevailed in 
2005−2007.
3  This finding concurs with the growing appetite for risk on the part of banks that were 
tapping into global excess liquidity on the international markets to expand the loan supply further. 
During the recent financial turmoil, a  negative loan supply shock of extremely large magnitude  is 
observed in 2008Q4 following the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. We also note a series of positive 
loan supply shocks in 2009 (possibly related to the easing of lending policy by state-controlled 
banks at that time) before new negative shocks emerge. 
 
 
                                                 
3 During this event, the wave of largely unfounded rumors and conjectures about impendent liquidity problems in the 
banking sector eroded household confidence in the national banking system and impeded financial intermediation. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Our  identified  monetary  stance  innovations  (Fig.  8)  are  mostly  positive  during  the  period 
2004−2007, and seem to represent adequately the accommodative monetary policy conducted over 
the period. Starting in the latter half of 2008, we observe negative shocks (including one of un-
precedented magnitude in 2008Q4). These are followed by positive shocks in 2009. This pattern 
plausibly mirrors the rapid shrinking of the money stock in late 2008 and early 2009, as well as its 
exogenously resuscitated growth after the CBR recommences forex buying and the government’s 
fiscal measures start to fray. As these processes fade in 2010, we observe a series of negative mone-
tary stance shocks. 
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As shown in Busch et al. (2010), the deviations of loans from the baseline projection of the model 
may be decomposed into the cumulated sum of the identified structural shocks. We present this his-
torical decomposition (Fig. 9) to get an insight into the drivers behind lending trends. 
While the comovement of shocks may indicate insufficient distinction of the two types, our 
results seem generally plausible and are confirmed by the estimates of the alternative model (Annex 
III). The decomposition shows that the impact from the monetary stance shocks is positive in the 
period preceding the crisis and reaches its peak at the beginning of 2008. Following the contraction-
ary monetary stance shock, the impact turns negative in 2009. Recalling the prolonged transmission 
length, we expect the impact to remain negative for some time. This finding contrasts with the re-
sults of Busch et al. (2010), who, based on German data,  suggest the monetary policy shocks were 
essentially neutral during the crisis. As explanation, we again note that Russia’s monetary stance in 
this period was not determined exclusively by the CBR. 
Thus, the driving forces behind the rapid fall of loans are not just monetary shocks. The 
magnitude the impact of the loan supply shocks in 2009 is comparable to that of monetary shocks. 
The estimates using an alternative monetary stance variable generally confirm these findings (An-
nex III). The historical decomposition produced by the model with monetary base variable indicates 
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impact of monetary stance shocks is expansionary until 2009, and negative thereafter. The alterna-
tive model also indicates that loan supply and monetary stance shocks contribute to the credit con-
traction in roughly equal measure.  
 





5  Conclusions 
 
The rapid growth in bank lending that took place in Russia over the last decade was largely fuelled 
by exogenous growth of money stock as determined by the CBR’s forex purchases. Russian banks 
also exploited the availability of foreign borrowing to boost the domestic lending growth even fur-
ther. In late 2008, capital flows reversed and the ruble money stock shrank in response to severe 
monetary tightening. In addition, increased general uncertainty as to international financial markets 
and the domestic real sector caused the banks to restrict access to loans. 
Using a formal model, we find that both these factors contributed significantly to the con-
traction in lending in 2008−2009. The expansionary monetary stance ended in late 2008, further 
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caused by recommencement of FX purchases by the CBR and direct financing of the budget deficit 
from the sovereign funds was reflected by expansionary monetary innovations in 2009Q4. Even so, 
these developments only partially explain the decline in lending growth as the important drivers be-
hind recent lending trends have not been directly related to the monetary stance. Finally, we identi-
fied a contractionary loan supply shock of unprecedented magnitude that contributed in roughly 
equal measure to the contraction in lending. 
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Annex II: Empirical validation of sign restrictions 
 
Here, we check whether the imposed sign restrictions on impulse response functions are supported 
or contradicted by the data. This is quite relevant as our empirical strategy implies shuffling not 
only through the structural shocks identification matrices but also through the VAR coefficients. 
We propose a couple simple exercises to gain insight into the extent the imposed sign restrictions 
are validated by the observed data. We report the results for estimates on the full time sample 
(1999Q1−2010Q4) and on the pre-crisis time sample (1999Q1−2008Q2). 
Following Chadha et al. (2008), one criterion could be the percentage of accepted draws 
out of total draws needed to accept 5,000 conforming models. The suggested benchmark is 15%. 
Our results stand at: 
 
Full time sample – 99.9% (5,000 out of 5,004) 
Pre-crisis time sample – 3.5% (5,000 out of 142,207) 
 
The  results  indicate  our  suggested  sign  restrictions  are  valid.  However,  estimating  the 
VAR-model only on the pre-crisis time sample drastically decreases the chances of obtaining results 
conforming to the sign restrictions. 
We now move to a few formal tests to analyze whether the distribution of VAR parameters 
of 5,000 accepted models (B_acc) deviate significantly from the distribution of parameters of ini-
tially drawn 1,000 models (B). We perform the tests for each of 80 individual VAR parameters, as 
well as for the aggregate distribution of all standardized parameters.
4  
First, we test if the means of two distributions are equal: H 0: bi-b_acci = 0. For this pur-
pose, we use the standard t-statistic: 
 
) _ ( ) (















where  i B   and  i acc B_   are  the  sample  means  of  two  distributions,  ) (
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i scc B S are the standard deviation of two distributions,  n =1000 and m =5000 are the distribu-
                                                 
4 We use the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of 1,000 initially drawn parameters to standardize the re-
spective parameters of accepted models. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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tion sizes. We use the quantiles of normal distribution      (0,1) to test the hypothesis, which is 
acceptable for large samples. 
Second, we test for the homogeneity of distributions using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
rank test (Mann and Whitney, 1947). This test implies the hypothesis H0: Р(Bi < B_acci) = 1/2 and 
the following test statistic: 
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N  for large n and m. 
The results are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3  Results of sign restriction validity tests 
 
Number of parameters 
(Full time sample) 
Number of parameters 















p-value>0.1  80  80  18  15 
0.05<p-
value<0.1 
0  0  4  5 
0.01<p-
value<0.05 
0  0  6  7 




-0.13  0.06  3.1  2.29 
 
The results indicate that, for the benchmark model, none of the VAR parameters of the initially 
drawn and eventually accepted models were significantly different. For the models estimated on the 
pre-crisis sample, the VAR parameters of accepted models had to be noticeably different from our 
initially estimates to fulfill the sign restrictions. 
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Annex III: Alternative model estimates with monetary base  
used as monetary stance variable 
 
Impulse responses to expansionary loan supply shock (shaded area = sign restriction period) 
 


















































median 16%-quantile 84%-quantile  
 
Impulse responses to expansionary monetary stance shock (shaded area = sign restriction period) 
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